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Johann Nikolaus Tetens published in 1777 his Philosophical Enquiries on 
human nature and its development. In this monumental work, it is easy to 
recognize the conceptual knots and the questions that had been rapidly 
arising as a consequence of a wider and deeper scientific knowledge and that 
remained decisive for more than a generation of scientists and thinkers. Since 
the very beginning, Tetens explicitly challenges the most relevant and 
influential position of his time. In particular, anticipating the close 
confrontation with Bonnet, that he considers a focus point of his research, he 
acknowledges that the development of the essence of the soul, as well as of the 
series of ideas, the implementation of the whole system of thoughts and the 
origin of capacities are all something physical in the brain and trigger therefore 
the question whether or not they should be considered as a process analogous 
to the development and growth of organized bodies. An enquiry on human 
nature cannot but end as an enquiry on freedom, i.e. on the capacity of the 
soul to be the active, autonomous and sufficient cause of action, even if this 
causality implies the capacity to contrast all sensations and representations 
that affect the soul itself, the capacity to fight them down and, in the end, to 
eliminate their effects1. 
                                                            
1 J.N. Tetens, Philosophische Versuche über die Menschliche Natur und ihre Entwicklung 
(1777), Hildesheim-New York, Olms, 1979, vol. I, pp. XI e XXXV e vol. II, pp. 121-122. 
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Tetens was designed by Karl Rosenkranz as “the German Locke”. His 
work provides a prize example of the clear awareness of the content and 
possible consequences of the European scientific and philosophical debate in 
which Germany was also engaged and, at the same time, of a specific way to 
meet this challenge, a sort of “third way” between dogmatic and materialistic 
psychology. His method is unquestionably the one that starts with 
experience. For Tetens, the argument that an inner part of our body (brain, 
sensorium commune, schema perceptionis) is working whenever the soul 
expresses itself is a matter of experience and therefore a kind of “empirical 
proposition”. On the other hand, building on Wolff’s distinction between vis 
and facultas, he points at a fundamental power whose effects are – as to the 
inner point of view – always expressions of one and the same type: it is from 
this fundamental power that all other capacities and powers derive2. The final 
outcome of this balance is uncertain and wavers in Tetens’ Enquiries between 
the idea of an animated brain and the old-fashioned, ontological conception of 
the substantial unity that should be provided by an immaterial essence, 
beyond the body organ3. 
The “classics” of German philosophy between eighteenth and nineteenth 
century did not dismiss this commitment to a deeper insight of what really 
happens in and through our brain and our body. They did not remain simply 
unaware of the new findings that jeopardized and progressively eroded the 
theological as well as philosophical bulwarks of dualism. However, they are 
not usually considered a promising starting point for understanding the 
historical background of the contemporary philosophical reflection on the 
body and, in particular, of the so called mind-body problem. In the end, that 
seems to be for sound reasons. Kant’s great division between the realm of 
necessity in which the homo phaenomenon lives and eventually dies and the 
realm of freedom that constitutes the responsibility of the homo noumenon has 
become the touchstone of metaphysical incompatibilism. There needs to be 
                                                            
2 Cfr. Ibidem, vol. II, p. 158 and vol. I, p. 731. 
3 Ibidem, vol. II, pp. 169 and 210. 
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such a deep, insurmountable fault, in order to guarantee an actual causal 
capacity of the will with regard to its own deeds. This conception did not 
withstand the clash with the more and more advanced knowledge about the 
functioning of the brain and the many “material” premises of what we are 
used to call freedom. The least we have to say, looking back at the age of 
Enlightenment, is that many other authors and lines of thinking paved the 
way to the contemporary “scientific” debate. These authors’ language was 
either French or English. Their explicit goal was to completely dismiss the old 
metaphysics, rather than renew it and its dualism. Nowadays, we cannot 
escape the challenge of the uncompromising materialism attested in Diderot’s 
Letter to Landois, even when we do not share all the consequences of a naïve 
monism: “There is, properly speaking, but one and only one sort of causes: 
the physical causes. There is but one and only one sort of necessity, that is the 
same for all beings, whatever destination we might like to look at”4. At the 
same time, the content of “practical” reason appears much more focused on 
the goal of “worldly” happiness than on that of a too much spiritualized, 
“disembodied” virtue. According to Helvétius, moral is simply “the science of 
the instruments discovered by human beings to live together in the happiest 
possible way”5. Bentham, some decades later and building on his new 
principles of morals, proposes a table of the “springs of action” with the aim 
of getting rid of the many psychological entities that we call wishes, hopes or 
interests. All of them are nothing more than “fictitious entities”, that are to 
be reduced to the only real entities we are allowed to speak of: pleasure and 
suffering6.  
This would be an easy, yet a hasty conclusion. More than two centuries 
have lapsed, but even for the strongest reductionism, that relies on the 
                                                            
4 D. Diderot, Lettre à Landois , in Oeuvres completes, vol. IX, Paris, Hermann, 1981, pp. 
253-60. 
5 C.A. Helvétius, De l’homme (1772), in Ouvres complètes, Hildesheim, Olms, 1967-1969, 
vol. IX, p. 140. 
6 J. Bentham, Table of the Springs of Action, in Deontology together with A Table of the 
Springs of Action and Article on Utilitarianism, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1983, pp. 5-115. 
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argument that moral properties are just supervening properties, it remains 
true that the moral, “spiritual” experience brings something new in the 
naturalistic point of view. Maybe, the relevant facts concerning human beings 
and their world are in the end as objective as stones. However, this argument 
has to be balanced with the awareness that there would be no room for good 
and evil in a universe just made out of stones: put persons in it, and you will 
introduce the possibility of value with one and the same shot7. This is where 
the mind-body problem still steps in. It is not simply about developing the 
compatibilist approach, therefore starting with Hume and his interpretation 
of freedom as spontaneity, that was – it goes without saying – quite different 
from Tetens’ (as well as Kant’s) conception: we consider our deeds as free 
inasmuch as they are caused by acts of will and not because we think that 
those acts of will are themselves free in the sense of a first, autonomous and 
unconditional ground. Neither is it about contending a “thin” conception of 
universality, that should give up whatever sort of “metaphysical” 
explanation of the will and build on the humble awareness that there must be 
some principle of humanity in which every human being, in some degree, 
concurs, at least as long as the human heart will be compounded “of the same 
elements as at present”8. It is about the possibility to overcome the “great 
division” not just by the unilateral conclusion that “on the scientific view 
human behavior is not caused by our intentions, beliefs, and desires” and 
“free will is an illusion because the brain is a deterministic physical organ, and 
it is the brain that is doing the causal work”. What we are called upon to deal 
with is the question whether or not it could be possible to maintain a 
plausible meaning and possibly a specific domain – according exactly to the 
scientific view – for the vocabulary of the so called “humanistic view”, based 
on concepts such as intentional agents and their goals, responsibility, social 
                                                            
7 P. Railton, Essays Toward a Morality of Consequence, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2003, pp. 16 and 47. 
8 D. Hume, An Enquiry concerning the principles of morals, London, A. Millar, 1751, 
Section IX, Part I. 
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and cultural frameworks of human action9. This is not edification outside or 
sometimes even against science. This is rather the legacy of Darwin’s 
acknowledgment that just the moral sense and its expressions remain perhaps 
the most important and highest distinction between human beings and other 
animals, a difference – even though in no way an ontological threshold – that 
we have to pay attention to, once that the “mystery” of our descent has been 
disclosed. This is with all evidence the case – just to give an example – with 
neuroethics, that “has emerged because advances in the neurosciences present 
us with ethical questions; however, there would be no questions at all if we 
believed that ethics and neurosciences were incompatible”10.   
 The issue of freedom as embodied freedom plays indeed an important 
role, even if a too often neglected one, in the most influential authors of the 
German philosophy on the edge of Aufklärung and after it. The 
“anthropological” side of their works has long been the less frequented and 
considered. Nevertheless, it is a chapter of the history we are moving forward, 
trying to line with the unprecedented pace of the progress of scientific 
knowledge. There may even be some points, where it is exactly this progress 
that renews the topicality of this thought and allows us to speak of a German 
path (that is in any case not to be confused with the main road) to the mind-
body problem. 
  
 
                                                            
9 T. Buller, Brains, lies, and psychological explanations, in J. Illes (ed.), Neuroethics. 
Defining the Issues in Theory, Practice and Policy, Oxford-New York, Oxford University 
Press, 2006, p. 52. 
10 Ivi. 
